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Abstract 
Being one of the few remaining communist States in the world, North Korea offers a good example 
of a constrained economy facing dramatic internal and external pressures. Although land transport 
dominates in North Korea due to border trade with China and Russia, maritime transport better 
reflects its position in the global economy. Based on worldwide vessel movements at all ports 
connected to North Korea between 1985 and 2006, indicators of maritime connectivity closely 
match the country’s evolution according to its political and economical changes. Alongside with a 
spatial contraction of forelands stemming from diplomatic isolation, industrial decline, trade 
embargo, and infrastructure dereliction after the collapse of the USSR (1991) and the nuclear crisis 
(1993-1994), results also show a process of regionalization and port concentration in Northeast Asia 
at a time of increased openness, cooperation projects, and foreign investments following the inter-
Korean summit (2000) and the economic reforms (2002). Finally, comment are given about internal 
factors such as inter-regional disconnection, transport system dereliction, logistics costs, and 
accessibility that result in a growing divide between East and West coasts.  
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INTRODUCTION 
The growth and extension of seaborne trading links are widely recognized as reflecting the 
dynamism of a maritime country. Recent changes in the operation of sea transport have altered this 
linear relation, because of port concentration and selection stemming from the strategies of main 
carriers and technological changes in sea transport (Slack, 1993; Hoffmann, 1998), resulting in 
more concentrated port ranges and the development of hub ports.  
While a vast literature depicts such phenomenon, there has been little efforts analysing the 
hub dependence of a given country or port. Most studies focus on individual port traffics rather than 
on inter-port relationships, with results identifying the main hub ports of a given area. The obvious 
lack is that it ignores how much the traffic of other ports depends on those hubs. Only estimations 
from the press give approximate figures of hub dependence, such as the 80% of Indonesian imports 
and exports passing through Singapore and Malaysia (Ghani, 2006). This shows that hub 
dependence is a major issue for several ports of the world, for which reducing such dependence 
necessitates large investments in new infrastructures. The majority of research emphasises the 
evolution of hub dependence through qualitative case studies. For example, the cases of Indonesia 
(Airriess, 1989), South China (Wang, 1998), and post-soviet countries (Ledger and Roe, 1996; 
Thorez, 1998), all highlights how technical, institutional, and cultural barriers have been overcome 
to reduce the dependence on neighbouring transit ports (Singapore, Hong Kong, Rotterdam) in 
accessing the world economy through more direct calls of global ocean carriers. Conversely, other 
studies show the increased hub dependence of some countries such as Japan, with the concentration 
of hub services in Busan and Gwangyang, South Korea (Fremont and Ducruet, 2005).  
In this paper, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK, hereafter North Korea) is 
chosen as an example of an isolated and declining economy. The impact of such evolution on 
maritime trade is worth analysing although the latter is not a top priority in North Korea, due to the 
influence of the soviet development model and the preferential landward relations with China and 
Russia. All other relations with more distant trade partners such as Japan, South Korea, Cuba, and 
Thailand, occur by sea using the eight trading ports located along the east and west coastlines 
(Figure 1).  
Given the specific evolution of the North Korean economy, which has not yet been 
recovered due to political tensions harming transition as in other socialist - or former socialist - 
countries, is there a specific impact on the pattern of maritime transport? Is North Korea a unique 
case? Such questions can be related to previous works on the linkages between maritime systems, 
industrial development and spatial cycles in general (Rodrigue et al., 1997), and on the specific 
changes brought by political shifts to the geographical pattern of maritime networks and inter-port 
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relations within a regional area, as seen in the post-Soviet Baltic (Brodin, 2003), and post-Apartheid 
South African (Iheduru, 1996) cases. However, due to the lack of data, analytical framework, and 
applied research using space-time statistics, those studies have been limited to qualitative 
assessments and speculative conclusions about the link between economic and spatial change in the 
case of maritime systems.  
 
Figure 1: General layout of the North Korean transport system 
 
Source: authors, compiled from various sources 
 
A first section introduces the data source, the methodology used, and the preliminary 
outcomes showing the main trends affecting North Korean maritime trade in the last two decades. A 
second section focuses more on the geographical evolution of North Korean maritime linkages on a 
world and Northeast Asian scales, based on trading cargo vessels calling at this country. A third 
section discusses the outcomes of the research for North Korea’s port and regional development. 
Finally, conclusive remarks are given about the implications of the research for maritime studies.   
 
 
 4 
1. GENERAL TRENDS OF NORTH KOREAN MARITIME TRADE 
1.1 Data sources and methodology 
Although broad evolutions of the North Korean economy are well addressed in various 
papers and official reports, there is a huge lack of information on detailed sectors, and notably the 
transport sector. Recent studies have managed to estimate the domestic modal split (Roussin and 
Ducruet, 2006) and the relative importance of sea transport in total trade (Jo and Ducruet, 2006). It 
confirms that maritime trade in North Korea is likely to oscillate between 10% and 20% in the last 
two decades, and this share has been quite stable except from a slight increase during the peak 
period of humanitarian aid in the late 1990s. Since a detailed overview of the available sources to 
study the North Korean transport system is provided elsewhere (Ducruet and Jo, 2007), this paper 
focuses only on the maritime part. Some seaborne traffic figures are provided by the International 
Road Transport Union (Switzerland) up to 1990, are estimated until 2020 by the Korea Maritime 
Institute (South Korea), and are also provided for inter-Korean shipments by the Ministry of 
Unification (South Korea). There are also some estimates of port traffics in various South Korean 
governmental reports
3
 but it is limited to estimates of total tonnage with no time series. However, 
all figures are difficult to use since they are not comparable with each other due to different periods 
and areas covered. Regular media announcements
4
 provide also figures on inter-Korean sea 
transport and North Korean port traffics, but these offer such contrast with official sources that we 
have chosen not to include them in the analysis.  
In this paper, North Korea-related vessel movements provided by Lloyd’s Marine 
Intelligence Unit, a world leader in maritime insurance activities and shipping information, are 
chosen as the only possible source to address the evolution of shipping, as no data exists about port 
traffics apart from estimates provided by governmental organisations. Moreover, vessel movements 
allow studying the inter-port linkages that can be used as a surrogate for maritime trade linkages.  
The total capacity of all vessels calling at North Korea has been summed by foreign port and 
by type of ship on a yearly basis, so as to get a global snapshot of the seaborne linkages of North 
Korea. We are aware of the limits of such methodology. First, the summing of vessel capacities at 
the ports connected by sea to North Korea only reflects broadly the real amount of loaded and 
unloaded cargoes in each port. Second, the spatial pattern of connected ports cannot overlap 
perfectly with the pattern of trading ports, as some vessels call at multiple ports in order to serve 
different markets or to bunker. Third, the data source is not based on the different services offered 
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 e.g. Yonhap News, Korea Times, Joongang Daily, People’s Daily, Korean Central News Agency 
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by shipping lines, but on the movements of ships. It means that there is no possibility to distinguish 
ports of origin and ports of destination from other ports.  
Although it may appear very cautious to use such data to study the evolution of shipping for 
a given area, there are many advantages. First, it can be argued that any company willing to call at 
North Korea will have a specific behaviour in terms of service and cargo, i.e. reflecting preferential 
linkages with specific countries which have commercial relations with North Korea. Second, it has 
a global coverage, as no spatial limit has been addressed to the data collection. Thus, it may reveal 
over time how shipping lines and regions have seen their activity modified with regard to the 
evolution of the North Korean economy. Thus, maritime connectivity is seen in this paper as a 
means to highlight multi-scalar changes in the relations between North Korea and its global and 
regional environment. Here, connectivity is understood through its general meaning in economic 
and transport geography: “aggregate measure of the extent to which the nodes of a network are 
linked (directly or indirectly) to other nodes. Connectivity always refers to characteristics of a 
whole network, not to those of a single node” (Krumme, 2005). Therefore, connectivity is different 
from other network measures such as connexity, which is port-based, or inter-connectedness, that 
better reflects the relations between components or nodes within a firm’s environment.  
 
1.2 North Korean economy and international trade 
Following the Korean War (1950-1953) and the separation from the then-called Republic of 
Korea (hereafter South Korea), the North Korean economy has officially adopted the ideology of 
self-sufficiency while sustaining predominant commercial relations with other socialist countries, of 
which China and the USSR were also border neighbours. While the steady growth of the North 
Korean economy until the 1970s can be explained by massive investments in heavy industries and 
construction, it has been supported since then through friendly energetic support from USSR and, 
later, China. Such system has started to falter after 1987 – the heyday of the North Korean economy 
– but the decline really starts from the fall of the Berlin Wall (1989), and accelerates with the 
collapse of the USSR and the socialist block in 1991. 
Paradoxically, it is because of trade dependence that North Korea has become suddenly 
isolated and unable to develop and modernize its own transport and economic system. Without oil 
and capital, most activities including agriculture, mining, transport, and various industries have 
stopped throughout the country (Roussin and Chabaud-Latour, 2006). Moreover, the lack of 
investment in light industries and consumer goods due to the predominance of heavy and defence 
industries have avoided the development of a competitive advantage in the world economy (Jo, 
2000). Additionally, the mid-1990s have accentuated this dramatic situation with the political crisis 
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after the death of president Kim Il-Sung, because of the vacancy left until the empowerment of 
leader Kim Jeong-Il (1994-1996). Massive floods due to deforestation resulted in spreading 
famines, and the first nuclear crisis was condemned by the US with the Wassenaar Agreement 
(1996), putting a commercial embargo on North Korea. The effects of such difficulties are clearly 
visible on the evolution of North Korean trade (see figure 2).  
 
Figure 2: Evolution of North Korean and inter-Korean trade, 1990-2006 
 
Source: authors, calculated from Korea Trade and Investment Promotion Agency (KOTRA) 
N.B. Total trade in 2006 comprises only trade with China, Japan, South Korea, Russia and Germany 
 
It is only since 2000 that signs of change have appeared, notably with the historical inter-
Korean summit, the economic reforms of July 2002, the growing foreign investments, and the 
cooperation projects of which the Gaeseong Industrial Park financed by South Korea and opened in 
2004, which employs 10,000 North Korean workers in 15 factories at the end of 2006 (Ministry of 
Unification in South Korea, 2006). Also, the Mount Geumgang International Tourism-Free Zone 
(2004) has attracted important volumes of South Korean tourists since its creation. This is also 
reflected in the constantly growing relative share of South Korean trade in overall North Korean 
trade, as seen in figure 2.  
Other projects, such as the Rajin-Seonbong free-trade zone (1991), the Korean Peninsula 
Energy Development Organization (KEDO, 1995), and the Sinuiju Special Administrative Region 
(SAR, 2002) have all provided limited results due to politics. For Rajin-Seonbong, further research 
has infirmed the usual argument of remoteness to explain the relative failure of the project, that is 
better explained by lack of management as selected industries – casino, telecommunications, 
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tourism, hotel – had little relation with the port (Jo and Ducruet, 2007). More recently, the July 
2006 nuclear tests resulting in increased trade embargo from the United Nations, Japan, and the US, 
have dramatically affected the positive effects of the reforms, foreign investments, and the ongoing 
cooperation projects. However, since 2007, the North Korean government has accepted to dismantle 
its nuclear facilities through the Six-Party Talks process, in exchange of the restart of financial 
support and peace talks.  
 
1.3 The evolution of maritime traffics 
A general look at the relative evolution of trade and shipping allows verifying both the 
accuracy of the data on vessel movements and, beyond, the varying importance of sea transport for 
international trade.  
 
Figure 3: Relative evolution of North Korean international trade and shipping, 1985-2006 
 
Sources: authors, calculated from Korea Trade and Investment Promotion Agency (KOTRA) and Lloyd’s Marine 
Intelligence Unit (LMIU) 
N.B. Total trade in 2006 comprises only trade with China, Japan, South Korea, Russia and Germany 
 
Figure 3 is based on relative numbers based on 1985 values for three series: total trade, total 
capacity of the ships on a world scale in all ports connected to North Korea, and total capacity of 
the ships calling at North Korean ports only. Since the two last series are based on the same source, 
it is normal that the curves show a very close evolution along the period, while the slight differences 
are explained by the more or less extended ship movements.  
 8 
At first glance, we see that shipping activity has been constantly declining and has never 
gone back to its original level of 1985. Although trade shows a comparable evolution, there are 
important differences that can be explained as follows: 
 along the period, trade has become more land-based, because shipping has declined more and 
faster than total trade. This can be interpreted as the effect of geopolitical isolation with the 
loosening of international commercial and diplomatic relations, and the growing unilateral 
relations with China. The parallel growth of trade and shipping from 1998 to 2001 illustrates the 
peak of humanitarian aid imports; 
 there are two important gaps between trade and shipping (1987-1990 and 2002-2006. The first 
gap stems from the sudden fall of oil shipments for which sea transport was the dominant mode, 
at a time of loosening ties with the collapsing Soviet Union and the capitalist converted China.. 
The second gap is better explained by the increased trade with China, mostly based on land 
transport as 80% of North Korean exports pass through the border city of Sinuiju; 
 one short but noticeable peak of maritime activity between 2004 and 2005 directly reflects the 
lower shipping costs to and from Nampo, Pyongyang’s gateway port, and the inter-Korean 
maritime agreement (2004) to boost the circulation of Korean ships, notably between Incheon 
and Nampo ports. However, both trade and shipping have been dramatically affected by the 
second nuclear tests of mid-2006.  
 
There are also important differences according to the type of commodities (Figure 4). 
General cargo occupies the largest capacity, probably because maritime transport in North Korea is 
used as a complement to land transport, which is mostly used for raw materials and bulky products 
(Roussin and Ducruet, 2006).  
Therefore, the two categories on which North Korea is the most dependent, general cargo 
and liquid bulk (chemical, tanker) have declined more rapidly. The rapid decline of liquid bulk from 
1987 to 1988 illustrates the worsening relations with the traditional socialist partners that used to 
provide oil in exchange of other goods (textiles, fish products, non-ferrous metals, machineries…). 
Since then, North Korea has not been able to purchase oil on the world market due to the lack of 
foreign currencies. The peak of liquid bulk traffics between 1998 and 2002 clearly indicates the 
effect of humanitarian aids that is also the case for solid bulks.  
Bulk traffic has been more stable along the period for two reasons. First, North Korea 
possesses enormous amounts of natural resources such as sands, mine products, ferrous and non-
ferrous metals, which could have been exported although the oil-dependent extraction and carriage 
processes have faced some difficulties. Second, since the North Korean economic system is 
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dominated by heavy industries, it has continued purchasing low-valued goods on the world market, 
although it is estimated than only 20% of existing factories are still in operation nowadays. Finally, 
container and ro-ro ships are of minor concern, due to the lack of container handling facilities in this 
country, on one side, and to the very limited trade, consumption, and production of finished and 
semi-finished products.  
 
Figure 4: Traffic evolution at North Korean ports by main commodity, 1985-2006 (Unit: 000s DWT) 
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Sources: authors, calculated from Lloyd’s Marine Intelligence Unit (LMIU) 
N.B. Bold color indicates values higher than the row’s average 
 
2. A GEOGRAPHICAL ANALYSIS OF NORTH KOREAN MARITIME CONNECTIONS 
2.1 Maritime connectivity, port performance and external hub concentration 
In order to highlight the nature of the evolution of North Korean shipping, a set of indicators 
has been calculated from the vessel movements on various geographical scales (Table 1). While 
selected indicators are similar to those used in recent studies of shipping connectivity, such as the 
number and maximum – or average – size of vessels by port of call, they are not completed by other 
types of indicators such as port infrastructure characteristics, and inter-port distance tables, freight 
rates, bilateral trade figures and other economic indicators such as GDP (Hoffmann and 
Wilmsmeier, 2007). Another difference is that most former research has taken place within a 
comprehensive geographical area – the Mediterranean or Caribbean basins – where analytical tools 
such as network theory and central place theory can be applied (Mc Calla et al., 2004; Cisic et al., 
2007). Comparatively, our research extends to the world scale, and one would acknowledge that the 
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information used in former studies does obviously not exist on such level and for a period of 22 
consecutive years. In addition, new indicators of are produced for the specific needs of this study, 
labelled as concentration and performance indicators.  
 
Table 1: Selected indicators on maritime activity 
Type of 
indicator 
Indicator Calculation method 
Concentration 
External port concentration (1) Maximum value of DWT percentages among directly connected port (%) 
External port concentration (2) Maximum value of TEU percentages among directly connected port (%) 
Connectivity 
Global connectivity (1) Total number of ports connected to North Korea worldwide 
Global connectivity (2) Total number of calls worldwide 
External connectivity Total number of directly connected ports 
Internal connectivity Total number of calls at North Korean ports 
Performance 
Average ship size Total DWT divided by the number of ships calling at North Korean ports 
Share of small vessels Percentage of vessels under 4,500 DWT among total vessels (%) 
Average age of North Korean ships Average difference between year of building and year of shipping 
Share of North Korean ships Percentage of ships under North Korean flag among total vessels (%) 
Source: authors 
 
Container capacities refer to the number of available container slots on the ships. It is 
separated from total deadweight tonnage because external concentration is more likely to happen in 
the container business than in other shipping sectors. The size of ships is selected because it is 
widely accepted by port specialists as a direct indicator of both local performance (port 
modernisation) and global trend (trade importance). Thus, it can be used as well to highlight the 
lack of investment in port facilities and the decreasing trade. Also, the relative importance of North 
Korean ships in overall shipping can be used as an indicator for the involvement of foreign ships in 
North Korea’s international trade.  
As showed in Figure 5, the first maritime ring (Ring 1) concerns the immediate ports of calls 
before and after North Korean ports, while the second maritime ring (Ring 2) concerns any port 
connected to North Korea worldwide. Such distinction allows comparing two dimensions of spatial 
change.  
 
 
 
 
 11 
Figure 5: Spatial model of theoretical external hub development 
 
Source: authors 
 
The different concentration degrees within those rings may indicate the changing trade 
patterns but also the evolving behaviour of shipping companies willing to access North Korean 
ports. The more a shipping company is willing to connect directly distant ports to North Korea, the 
more North Korea is embedded in globalisation, and vice-versa. Figure 5 also shows a hypothetical 
phenomenon from Phase A, with long distance calls serving remote markets (Ring 2), and internal 
balance of the port system, to Phase B, with dominant short distance calls, internal port 
concentration and transport system dereliction.  
Thus, Figure 5 hypothesizes a correlation between internal and external factors shaping 
economic development and maritime systems. A developing country would be able to invest in the 
modernization of its own transport system in order to avoid concentration and congestion internally 
and externally. This allows more direct calls at multiple ports. Otherwise, only one main load centre 
will continue to grow at the expense of other isolated port hinterlands
5
. Consequently, this main 
load centre will also face technical limitations and become dependent on one main and close 
external hub.  
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 see Lee, Song and Ducruet, 2007 for a synthesis of port evolutionary models 
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The evolution of all indicators is compared in Figure 6 with reference to four important 
periods in the country’s evolution. Some new indicators have been calculated in order to relate 
different phenomenon at different scales, such as the percentage of North Korean calls in total calls, 
and the percentage of capacities at the directly connected maritime ring in the world total.   
 
Figure 6: Indicators of North Korean maritime connectivity and performance, 1985-2006 
 
Source: authors, calculated from Lloyd’s Marine Intelligence Unit 
N.B. Bold color indicates values higher than the row’s average 
 
 Four periods: from the trends observed, four periods can be distinguished. They all 
correspond to important political and economical changes in North Korea’s evolution, such 
as before USSR collapse (1985-1991), during the crisis (1992-1998), humanitarian aids 
(1999-2001), and the economic reforms / North-South improvements (2002-2006); 
 Performance and connectivity: the most striking declining indicators are those of 
performance (average ship capacity) and global connectivity (total ports connected through 
Ring 1 and Ring 2), while the growth of other performance indicators (average ship age, 
share of small vessels, share of North Korean ships) also indicate a decline of North Korea’s 
position in the world system. Long distance calls and services are gradually replaced by 
short-sea movements based on small shipments. However, some other indicators show the 
regain of performance and connectivity during the last period (2002-2006), with noticeable 
increase of total calls and decrease of the relative importance of North Korean ships. Thus, it 
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may be interpreted that in the recent years, North Korea has managed overcoming some 
constraints by attracting more shipping lines in a context of increased foreign investments. 
This is better reflected in the growing share of Ring 1 (direct connections) during the period 
of crisis (1992-1998), as an effect of global foreland contraction, but this share has gone 
back to pre-1991 values since 1999 due to increased internationalization. In the end, such 
evolution indicates a close relationship between geopolitical change and maritime change, 
resulting in increased isolation; 
 Port concentration: external concentration within Ring 1 is a very recent trend affecting 
North Korean ports. While it has been quite stable along the period, except from some 
important values in the late 1980s, probably due to the importance of Singapore and Hong 
Kong in North Korea’s connections, this concentration suddenly increases since 2002. 
Although the relation between this trend and the aforementioned loss of performance / 
connectivity is not demonstrated fully, there is much evidence about the interrelation 
between the different trends. Another aspect that is in line with former cases of hub 
development worldwide, is the stronger concentration of container traffics (TEUs) compared 
to total traffics (DWT). Thus, shipping lines handling containers are more likely to 
concentrate on one main hub – here between 50 and 70% of traffics – their services; 
 Overall trend: we see in Figure 6 a process of hub development through external port 
concentration and internal port limitations. This process is also explained by the restart of 
extensive port activity in a country which is not able to invest in modern facilities. Although 
trade amounts grow rapidly, shipping lines are forced to tranship the cargo from a pivotal 
port – or transit hub port – to a smaller vessel before calling at a North Korean port. In the 
end, results demonstrate to what extent recent changes in North Korean economic policy 
such as reforms, foreign investment, and cooperation projects have positively affected 
maritime activities. Over a short period of time, this activity has restarted although it still 
lacks of technical standards. Thus, it demonstrates that the extension of a country’s maritime 
connections in a globalized environment depends on industrial dynamism and port service 
quality, rather than transport costs. Global contraction and local constraints are thus 
combined to explain the unprecedented trend of port concentration within neighbouring 
ports. 
 
2.2 Regional distribution of traffics 
As a first step understanding the evolution of North Korea’s maritime linkages, Table 2 
provides an overview of the summation of vessel capacities by port region. At first glance, we 
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observe the growing share of Asia in the total capacity, from 62% in 1985 to 92% in 1986. Of 
course, this number is inflated because most ships calling at North Korean ports from and to other 
areas have also to call to other Asian ports. However, it is a good indicator of the isolation of the 
country over time. The most distant Asian port region, Middle East & Red Sea, has strongly 
reduced, but other areas have been quite stable while Northeast Asia. The closest area (Russian Far-
East, Japan, China, South Korea, and Taiwan), has increased its share twofold along the period, 
from 38% to 72%. It is interesting to see that until 1988, the share of Asia and of Northeast Asia 
were reducing, probably illustrating the continued international expansion of trade, although on 
fragile grounds. Thus, the dramatic decline starting from 1989 clearly depicts the geopolitical 
change in North Korea’s political and economical relations. Also, the sharp increase of Asia’s share 
between 2005 and 2006 confirms to what extent maritime linkages directly react to political issues, 
here the nuclear test. 
Some port regions have declined more rapidly than others. For example, the Black Sea and 
Scandinavia & Baltic port regions were key trading areas of the USSR until its collapse in 1991 
(e.g. wheat trade). The original weight of Central America and North Africa is better explained by 
their strategic position for global shipping, with the Suez and Panama canals, while their decline 
illustrates the loosening of long-distance trades with outlying areas, notably Northwest Europe 
(from 4.8% to 0.7%). Also, it highlights the economic decline and/or political change in brother 
countries such as Angola, Cuba, Nicaragua, Libya, and Algeria, which have enjoyed privileged 
relationships at that period. The revival of traffics in most areas during the period of humanitarian 
aids (1998-2002) is better illustrated in areas such as North America Gulf Coast (oil, grains), West 
Mediterranean (e.g. Gibraltar), and the aforementioned pivotal regions.  
This global snapshot of the geographical distribution of flows only answers one part of the 
original questions. Some regions have been more or less trading with North Korea over time, and 
others have remained transit regions through which most of the world’s ships pass. A more detailed 
look at the distribution by port of call would better answer the specific trend of change in the nature 
and extension of North Korea’s external maritime connections, and to verify the gradual building of 
a hub-and-spoke network around North Korea within Northeast Asia. 
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Table 2: Regional distribution of North Korea’s maritime connections, 1985-2006 (Unit: % DWT) 
Port region 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Asia, of which: 62.6 58.1 61.9 57.7 65.7 64.7 73.2 82.2 76.3 79.6 82.9 76.4 83.2 72.6 65.2 72.8 72.2 82.9 83.7 80.4 71.9 92.6 
Northeast Asia 37.6 34.3 33.8 31.9 33.9 33.2 44.7 55.9 52.6 55.0 58.7 45.6 60.4 44.3 39.8 51.4 42.9 62.4 59.4 64.0 51.4 70.8 
Southeast Asia 11.5 11.4 11.5 13.7 16.6 17.7 14.2 14.4 12.9 13.3 12.8 18.4 10.5 15.4 15.7 12.1 18.8 11.2 11.9 10.5 9.8 12.8 
North Korea 5.7 4.7 5.4 6.0 6.6 5.7 6.5 6.5 5.6 6.5 5.2 7.3 7.5 6.2 5.3 5.6 6.4 5.4 5.5 4.7 5.7 5.4 
Indian Subcontinent 2.8 3.3 3.7 3.2 6.2 4.8 4.1 4.2 4.4 3.3 5.5 4.2 4.1 3.5 2.9 1.6 2.9 2.2 3.8 0.8 2.6 3.0 
Middle East & Red Sea 5.2 4.3 7.4 2.9 2.4 3.3 3.7 1.2 0.9 1.5 0.7 1.0 0.7 3.2 1.5 2.0 1.4 1.7 3.1 0.5 2.5 0.6 
Europe, of which: 18.8 18.8 18.4 20.1 16.6 14.1 10.6 6.2 6.3 6.0 5.1 8.4 7.7 11.4 11.2 5.8 12.5 6.1 6.5 8.9 9.8 2.9 
Black Sea 6.8 8.3 5.7 7.5 8.9 6.5 3.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 2.2 3.6 2.3 0.4 1.2 0.9 1.7 1.3 1.2 2.4 2.0 0.2 
West Mediterranean & Iberian Peninsula 2.8 3.5 3.6 3.6 1.8 2.4 2.9 1.3 2.3 3.2 0.9 2.3 3.0 5.6 5.3 2.6 4.5 2.2 2.4 3.1 3.0 0.2 
Northwest Europe 4.8 2.5 3.4 4.0 2.7 2.5 1.7 1.7 1.5 0.9 1.0 1.0 0.4 1.9 1.4 0.7 2.2 1.0 0.9 0.7 1.3 0.7 
Scandinavia & Baltic 1.7 2.1 2.3 2.8 0.9 1.0 1.2 0.4 0.5 0.2 0.1 0.4 0.4 1.7 0.9 0.4 1.8 0.2 1.2 0.6 0.5 1.6 
British Isles 1.2 0.8 1.7 1.0 0.7 0.6 1.1 1.4 0.4 0.3 0.8 0.4 0.2 0.3 1.8 0.5 1.7 1.0 0.9 1.7 2.5 0.2 
East Mediterranean 1.4 1.6 1.6 1.0 1.6 1.2 0.7 0.5 0.6 0.4 0.1 0.6 1.4 1.4 0.6 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.1 0.5 0.5 0.0 
Africa, of which: 9.1 9.3 7.9 9.0 8.5 7.6 4.5 3.6 4.6 6.1 2.2 4.6 3.0 4.1 5.0 4.2 3.9 2.3 3.7 3.6 2.9 1.2 
North Africa 6.0 6.8 5.6 7.4 6.5 6.3 3.2 1.9 2.0 5.3 1.5 2.3 1.5 3.3 2.2 0.9 2.0 1.2 1.4 1.6 1.7 0.0 
West Africa 2.3 1.6 1.2 1.0 0.8 0.8 0.5 0.5 1.7 0.0 0.2 0.7 0.2 0.3 1.0 0.7 0.5 0.4 1.1 0.9 0.1 0.4 
Southern Africa 0.3 0.3 0.9 0.3 0.7 0.4 0.6 1.1 0.6 0.7 0.5 1.4 0.8 0.3 1.3 2.0 1.1 0.5 0.4 0.7 0.8 0.1 
East Africa & Indian Ocean 0.5 0.6 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.3 0.1 0.0 0.2 0.5 0.3 0.5 0.6 0.3 0.3 0.7 0.3 0.2 0.6 
North America, of which: 2.6 6.9 3.7 6.8 2.8 5.8 6.0 3.6 3.8 3.1 5.4 3.0 3.3 5.4 8.5 9.5 6.2 4.9 0.6 2.9 3.8 0.2 
North America West Coast 1.8 2.4 1.5 3.6 1.3 3.7 4.2 2.7 2.4 1.1 4.7 2.0 0.8 0.8 2.2 3.9 3.3 3.2 0.5 2.0 1.8 0.2 
North America Gulf Coast 0.4 2.4 1.1 1.2 1.0 1.3 1.2 0.6 1.1 1.5 0.2 0.7 1.6 3.7 4.6 3.7 1.7 1.1 0.2 0.2 1.1 0.0 
North America East Coast 0.4 2.2 1.1 2.0 0.5 0.8 0.5 0.3 0.3 0.6 0.5 0.3 0.9 0.9 1.7 2.0 1.3 0.6 0.0 0.8 0.8 0.0 
Latin America, of which: 2.8 4.0 3.0 2.5 1.5 2.3 1.2 0.8 1.9 0.7 0.5 0.7 0.5 1.7 4.0 2.0 2.3 1.0 0.4 1.3 1.7 0.1 
Central America 2.5 2.3 1.6 2.1 1.2 2.1 1.2 0.8 1.5 1.3 0.6 1.1 0.7 2.4 3.1 1.9 1.2 1.0 0.5 1.3 1.6 0.0 
South America East Coast 0.3 0.4 0.8 0.2 0.5 0.7 0.6 1.0 1.6 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.8 2.1 0.2 0.7 0.3 0.5 1.4 1.2 0.3 
Caribbean 0.8 1.2 0.6 0.9 0.5 0.6 0.2 0.3 0.1 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.1 0.5 0.9 0.5 0.9 0.9 0.0 0.7 0.1 0.0 
South America West Coast 0.1 0.1 0.6 1.1 0.5 0.4 0.0 0.0 2.1 0.0 0.2 0.7 0.1 1.5 0.2 0.7 0.6 0.3 0.1 0.0 0.2 0.0 
South America North Coast 0.1 0.2 0.4 0.1 0.2 0.0 0.3 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3 1.2 0.4 0.7 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 
Oceania & Pacific, of which: 3.1 2.7 4.1 1.9 3.5 3.8 3.4 2.1 3.7 3.4 3.0 5.3 1.3 1.0 2.7 3.9 1.0 0.8 4.4 0.8 8.4 2.7 
Oceania 2.5 2.4 3.7 1.7 3.3 3.6 3.3 1.8 3.6 3.4 2.6 5.3 1.3 0.9 2.6 3.5 0.9 0.7 3.6 0.7 8.2 2.7 
Pacific 0.6 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.3 0.2 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.5 0.1 0.2 0.7 0.1 0.2 0.0 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Source: authors, calculated from Lloyd’s Marine Intelligence Unit 
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3. THE EMERGENCE OF SOUTH KOREA AS NORTH KOREA’S MAIN TRANSIT 
HUB 
3.1 Measuring connexity at ports connected with North Korea 
 
Although a large part of the existing literature points at the emergence of port hubs 
within port regions, there is no recognized methodology for studying such trend. Thus, this 
paper proposes a simple approach based on the number of calls by port. This index can be 
associated to the wider group of connectivity indexes, because it sums on a yearly basis all 
ship movements realized within the North Korean-related worldwide maritime network. In so 
doing, the indicator summarizes embedded dynamics of great complexity, since various ships, 
companies, with various destinations and origins are included in this final number.  
The common aspect of all of the 1,720 related ports is that they each have been 
connected to North Korean ports – directly or indirectly – at least once between 1985 and 
2006. As mentioned earlier, there must be a rational selection of places by the shipping lines, 
according to the specific trading networks within which North Korea has been embedded over 
time, and also due to shipping costs for reaching North Korea itself. The number of calls will 
differentiate ports according to their degree of connectivity with North Korea’s trade flows, 
either for transit or for trade itself. The difficulty distinguishing transit calls from trade calls is 
not specific to this dataset, since most port studies are aware of the difficulty analysing 
transhipment rates in port traffics. Therefore, the number of calls can be employed as a 
surrogate for the geographical extension of North Korean maritime linkages and, beyond, for 
revealing which ports are more connected than others. Although one single call may hide a 
wide range of realities in terms of vessel type and vessel size, the sum of yearly calls still 
illustrates a degree of regularity in shipping movements. Also, it has the advantage of not 
being influenced by exceptional values stemming from the gap between conveyed ship 
capacities, such as between a containership of 200,000 DWT and a general cargo ship of 
20,000 DWT that would distort the results based on total or average capacity values.  
When calculating the percentage of neighboring countries in overall connexity (Figure 
7), it appears that closest transit ports have played a varying role over time. Japan, a major 
trading partner, has lost its dominance only since 2003 due to the decrease of commercial 
relations and the banning of North Korean ships from its ports. Until then, Japan has 
concentrated between 25% and 40% of all maritime connections of North Korea, notably in 
the period of isolation (1992-1998). Although trades with China and Russia are dominantly 
landward, their shares of maritime connections have also increased in recent years, but those 
 18 
of Russia have suddenly decreased since 2004. Notably, Dalian serves as a transit hub for 
Nampo traffics to and from Europe Thus, traffics have been redistributed to South Korea, 
which has now become the leading external hub, while it had concentrated only 3% to 12% of 
North Korea’s external connections until 1997.  
 
Figure 7: Connexity shares at North Korea’s neighbouring ports by country, 1985-2006 (% calls) 
 
Source: authors, based on Lloyd’s Marine Intelligence Unit 
 
3.2 Factors of traffic growth at South Korean ports 
 
 Several explanations can be given to the rise of South Korea as the leading hub: 
 The importance of humanitarian support, accounting for 25 to 60% of inter-Korean 
trade, due to the fact that South Korea is willing to avoid a sudden collapse of the 
North’s economy that would have in turn irremediable consequences on its own 
economy; 
 The continuous growth of inter-Korean trade that is realized 90% through maritime 
transport due to the blockage at the demilitarized zone (DMZ) between the two 
Koreas; 
 The successful economic cooperation projects following the inter-Korean summit that 
have required important shipments of raw materials and manufactured goods to build 
and start, notably, the Gaeseong Industrial Park; 
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 Institutional arrangements such as the inter-Korean maritime agreement (2004) 
focusing on the opening of new sea routes and inter-port cooperation, resulting in the 
agreement between Incheon and Nampo (2005) for regular ferry and container 
services; 
 The advantageous situation of South Korea as a pivotal hub allowing optimizing the 
servicing of both east and west coasts of the peninsula, in a context of maritime 
network reorganization of interested shipping lines in Northeast Asia.  
 
 As a result, Incheon is the most favorably located to serve the Nampo-Pyongyang 
industrial corridor (Roussin and Ducruet, 2007) where most recent investments have occurred 
(Figure 8).  
 
Figure 8: Connexity index at Northeast Asian ports connected to North Korea, 1985-2006 
 
Source: authors, based on Lloyd’s Marine Intelligence Unit 
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Also, Incheon is more directly accessible for small vessels willing to access North 
Korea, confirming its role as a hub of the Yellow Sea (Ducruet, 2007). Another explanation 
lies in the balance of trade, because North Korea imports more than it exports. Thus, the 
dominant hub is also the hub that is responsible for most imports from North, i.e. South 
Korea. It may be the case that export flows have a different spatial pattern, for example 
through North Korean ships using preferably Chinese or Russian hubs.  
Another possible analysis of hub dependence is to calculate for every North Korean 
port the share of its connections with immediately connected ports and countries. Table 3 
shows the results for the three main periods, retaining only the five highest shares and the 
main trading partners within Northeast Asia, with three main trends: 
 
 The South Korean hub: South Korean ports have realized the highest shares for some 
North Korean ports, as for Incheon for Haeju (84% inbound and 87% outbound) and 
Nampo (10% inbound and 13% outbound); Ulsan for Heungnam (23.5% inbound and 
25% outbound) and Songjin (31% outbound). Although other South Korean ports have 
increased their shares rapidly, they remain secondary connections for other North 
Korean ports. 
 The permanency of long-distance calls: the sustained importance of Singapore as the 
main external hub of some North Korean ports such as Cheongjin (9% inbound) and 
Songjin (12% inbound), together with Kaohsiung (Taiwan), Richards Bay (South 
Africa), Bangkok and Laem Chabang (Thailand) shows that some port cities have 
maintained some international trade efficiently. The North Korean ports for which 
distant ports are still directly connected for substantial shares are usually large cities, 
gateways to large and isolated hinterlands (Nampo-Pyongyang, Cheongjin, 
Heungnam-Hamheung), or locate close to cooperation projects (e.g. KEDO project 
and Songjin) (Ducruet, Gelezeau and Roussin, 2007). The relation between hinterland 
evolution and port traffic appears in Table 3, with a divide between East and West in 
terms of urban and port growth; 
 The regional specializations of maritime linkages: for other North Korean ports, the 
proximity is the main factor explaining the distribution of traffics, such as in the East 
between Rajin and Russian ports, between Wonsan and Japanese ports (e.g. ferry link 
with Niigata). Also among South Korean hubs, we see an effect of maritime façade 
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with strong connections among closely located ports, such as between Nampo, Haeju, 
and Incheon in the West, and between Heungnam, Cheongjin, Wonsan, and Busan, 
Ulsan, and Onsan in the East. Although the share of Japan has decreased dramatically, 
Japanese traffics are still dominant for Cheongjin, Wonsan, and Nampo.  
 
Table 3: Port and urban evolution in North Korea 
 
Urban population (000s) Port traffics (Totals) 
1983 (a) 1993 (b) 2002 (c) 1985-1991 (a) 1992-1998 (b) 1999-2005 (c) 
Cheongjin 754 520 674 4,611,125 1,991,722 2,149,775 
Hamheung-Heungnam 775 701 821 4,397,516 917,715 2,012,611 
Haeju 213 195 265 230,992 450,178 865,869 
Nampo-Pyongyang 2,880 3,307 3,833 8,478,900 6,842,432 7,836,534 
Wonsan 350 300 347 4,938,751 1,561,443 866,728 
Rajin-Seonbong 70 120 150 913,798 836,943 357,837 
 
Urban growth (%) Port traffics change (%) 
(a) to (b) (b) to (c) (a) to (c) (a) to (b) (b) to (c) (a) to (c) 
Cheongjin -31.0 29.6 -10.6 -56.8 7.9 -53.4 
Hamheung-Heungnam -9.5 17.1 5.9 -79.1 119.3 -54.2 
Haeju -8.5 35.9 24.4 94.9 92.3 274.8 
Nampo-Pyongyang 14.8 15.9 33.1 -19.3 14.5 -7.6 
Wonsan -14.3 15.7 -0.9 -68.4 -44.5 -82.5 
Rajin-Seonbong 71.4 25.0 114.3 -8.4 -57.2 -60.8 
Source: authors, calculated from various sources 
 
3.3 Implications for North Korea’s port and regional development 
 This research has highlighted for the first time regional dynamics in which North 
Korean ports are embedded. Of course, ports are not isolated from their local and regional 
environments, i.e. hinterlands. Therefore, port dynamics in North Korea must be closely 
related to internal changes in terms of regional evolutions of the economy. Such dynamics 
may be interpreted as follows: 
 
 Internal concentration: the trend of external port concentration that is one key element 
of the emergence of a hub serving a given area is accompanied in North Korea by the 
parallel trend of internal port concentration. Thus, although it is not well connected 
through land transport, the North Korean port system is undergoing a major spatial 
change with the westward shift of traffics favoring Nampo, the port gateway of 
Pyongyang. Therefore, the concentration on Incheon hub is also in some way 
reflecting the concentration on Nampo. This indicates to what extent internal and 
external factors are tied together; 
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 Industrial dynamics: a corollary of the previous trend of internal port concentration is 
the uneven industrial evolution within the country. Although major hinterlands such as 
Nampo-Pyongyang, Heungnam-Hamheung, and Cheongjin show a similar trend of 
sustained long-distance flows due to stronger industrial base than smaller cities, one 
can except that most seaborne trade occurs at Nampo, while Eastern cities have a 
higher percentage of humanitarian aids in their traffics. As mentioned elsewhere, most 
industrial and port facilities in the eastern part of the country, including also Wonsan, 
have deteriorated more rapidly than in the western part, due to several factors such as 
geopolitical change (loss of Russian and Japanese trades), peripheral location, and 
lack of energy and investments; 
 Logistics and accessibility: one other important factor to explain how diversely North 
Korean ports are responding to change is the logistic cost and the overall accessibility. 
Recent data provided by forwarders in North Korea, combined with data from NGOs 
all show the rapid increase of transport costs from Pyongyang to other cities of the 
east coast. In North Korea, most investments in road infrastructure have been made in 
the western area, resulting in poor accessibility to the east. Such divide is reinforced 
by natural factors such as land elevation and climate. This also can explain why 
Nampo is the only port that has been modernized in recent years. Also, it explains why 
most foreign investments (i.e. China and Europe) outside free-zones have occurred 
along the Nampo-Pyongyang industrial corridor in recent years (Roussin and Ducruet, 
2007).  
 
We can discuss further the implications for future development of such trends with the 
following developmental issues: 
 
 Regional disconnection: there is a risk that the economic space of the North Korean 
territory is more and more restrained to the core region of Nampo-Pyongyang. In this 
respect, the lack of transport policy – and the financial, technical means to implement 
it – cannot allow the different parts of the country to remain connected and form one 
single spatial system. We have in North Korea the emergence of several sub-systems 
having their own resources for economic development. For instance, not only the 
South Korean free-zones (Gaeseong, Mt. Geumgang) and the Chinese free-zones 
(Raseon, Sinuiju) are too far from each other to be interconnected, but also they are 
not well connected with the core region of Pyongyang-Nampo, except for Sinuiju. 
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However, this last free-zone is the only zone to have not succeeded in enticing foreign 
investments, due to politics and lacks of trade agreements. It can also be the case that 
such inter-regional disconnection is a planned policy of North Korea. This is reflected 
in the spatial distribution of the highway network, which has a political rather than 
economic rationale, since it does connect at the borders. Thus, the trend of external 
port concentration, coupled with sustained regional seaborne links of proximity, may 
reflect the will of North Korean officials to limit the circulation of goods within the 
country, preferring a multi-polar rather than an integrated territory as a defense 
strategy. In the eventuality of a military invasion, land-based troops would not be able 
to reach Pyongyang easily; 
 Further internationalization: in order to become better inserted within the global 
economy, North Korea has no option but to improve the way its ports are embedded 
within transport and logistics chains. However, the abovementioned limiting factors 
showed the trend of declining port capacity and increased external hub dependence. 
Although Nampo is a key element in the internationalization of Pyongyang core 
economic region, as hinted in the recent strategy of the Egyptian firm Orascom 
(cement) using Nampo as an export gateway, this port remains limited by the West sea 
Barrage, resulting in low nautical accessibility. In the near future, in the context of 
growing trade and foreign investments in this area, North Korean officials will face a 
lack of capacity and technical standards, as it was felt in Indonesian ports at early 
1980s. Thus, the issue is to what extent would a foreign terminal operator or a 
shipping line invest in stevedoring facilities in Nampo? One can imagine that 
Hutchinson Whampoa, a Hong Kong terminal operator which has experience in 
upgrading Shenzhen ports, Port of Singapore Authority (PSA), or Dubai Ports World 
(DPW) would probably be interested in such prospects for development. However, 
although North Korea has started its reform process, it does not yet open the door to 
multinational corporations of this size, notwithstanding the related Chinese or Arabic 
capitalistic culture of such organizations. Perhaps in North Korea, upgrading ports 
may require other methods, such as coupling foreign public investments with the 
resources of NGOs, so as to maintain the subtle equilibrium between sustained 
ideology and economic development necessity.  
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Conclusion 
This paper has demonstrated the economic factors and spatial mechanisms giving birth 
to hub dependence in the case of a constrained economy. Although such process is not 
specific to North Korea and has been verified elsewhere, such as the growth of hub ports 
stemming from technical limitations and rising handling costs in traditional port cities, it has 
been analyzed using an original methodology based on vessel movements. Not only the 
geographical pattern of those movements helps understanding the changing trades and 
behavior of shipping lines at various scales, but also the characteristics of the ships highlight 
internal factors such as port infrastructure dereliction resulting in decreasing average capacity. 
The shift from long-distance to short-sea shipping is thus measured precisely through the 
evolution of maritime connexity at main transit ports. However, hub dependence may greatly 
vary among ports of a single country, as it has been demonstrated with the varying roles of 
Russia, Japan, China, and South Korea in connecting North Korea with the outside world.  
Such methodology can be applied elsewhere in order to provide a comparative 
analysis, not only in constrained economies but also in developing and advanced economies, 
as a means to evaluate the impact of port planning on foreland extension. Notably, countries 
and ports that are willing to measure their hub dependence (e.g. Le Havre, viz. Antwerp and 
Rotterdam) may benefit from such research agenda.  
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Table 3: Distribution of cargo flows by main external connections by North Korean port, 1985-2006 (Unit: % DWT) 
Port 
Inbound flows Outbound flows 
1985-1991 % 1992-1998 % 1999-2006 % Pays 1985-1991 1992-1998 1999-2006 1985-1991 % 1992-1998 % 1999-2006 % Pays 1985-1991 1992-1998 1999-2006 
Cheongjin 
Singapore 11.7 Singapore 9.6 Singapore 8.8 Japan 50.4 44.9 25.8 Singapore 10.9 Maizuru 9.1 Maizuru 17.4 Japan 59.4 54.6 38.1 
Yokohama 5.3 Mutsure 6.3 Busan 8.8 China 14.1 21.0 7.5 Hong Kong 8.4 Shanghai 7.3 Richards Bay 15.3 China 16.3 10.6 5.0 
Mutsure 5.0 Hong Kong 5.7 Gwangyang 8.2 South Korea 0.8 7.7 27.2 Yokohama 5.7 Kinuura 7.2 Busan 14.1 South Korea 1.0 19.7 29.8 
Hong Kong 4.3 Kobe 4.6 Kaohsiung 8.1 Russia 0.3 2.0 2.5 Osaka 5.5 Mizushima 6.3 Ulsan 10.1 Russia 0.0 7.1 7.8 
Otaru 3.5 Dalian 4.0 Maizuru 7.0 Other 34.5 24.4 36.9 Chiba 3.9 Busan 5.8 Mipo 3.6 Other 23.3 8.0 19.3 
Haeju 
Dalian 17.8 Incheon 12.1 Incheon 84.0 Japan 18.7 49.2 2.7 Singapore 24.6 Kashima 15.1 Incheon 86.8 Japan 29.6 77.7 3.7 
Lianyungang 14.2 Yokohama 6.5 Busan 2.4 China 50.4 21.2 2.2 Lianyungang 10.5 Toyohashi 14.1 Busan 4.7 China 30.3 17.2 0.2 
Yokohama 8.8 Toyohashi 5.1 Gunsan 2.3 South Korea 2.0 15.2 92.7 Fukuyama 9.0 Himeji 7.0 Ulsan 2.8 South Korea 2.1 0.8 96.1 
Jeddah 8.7 Hirohata 4.8 Bangkok 2.0 Russia 1.8 4.3 0.0 Hong Kong 7.8 Qinhuangdao 6.9 Toyohashi 1.7 Russia 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Zhanjiang 6.8 Osaka 3.5 Hong Kong 1.9 Other 27.1 10.2 2.4 Kashima 6.8 Hitachi 6.9 Gunsan 1.2 Other 38.0 4.3 0.0 
Heungnam 
Singapore 21.5 Singapore 18.2 Ulsan 23.5 Japan 33.2 33.0 11.2 Singapore 33.0 Singapour 14.6 Ulsan 24.9 Japan 46.3 41.1 13.9 
Mutsure 5.5 Panama Canal 9.6 Busan 10.7 China 17.5 18.3 6.4 Fukuyama 6.7 Busan 14.0 Busan 12.7 China 10.5 10.9 8.3 
Dalian 4.4 Niigata 5.8 Singapore 9.6 South Korea 2.9 7.8 55.5 Kisarazu 5.3 Niigata 13.4 Onsan 10.7 South Korea 1.6 19.9 60.0 
Suez 4.2 Dalian 5.6 Incheon 7.7 Russia 1.2 3.1 3.7 Wakayama 4.1 Hakodate 7.4 Singapore 6.2 Russia 0.5 1.0 3.3 
Aden 3.8 Ko Sichang 2.8 Onsan 6.7 Other 45.2 37.8 23.2 Dalian 4.1 Guangzhou 5.1 Incheon 4.9 Other 41.1 27.1 14.5 
Nampo 
Singapore 13.7 Singapore 9.1 Incheon 9.9 Japan 37.2 39.1 29.5 Singapore 12.2 Oita 11.6 Incheon 12.7 Japan 43.9 51.3 33.8 
Dalian 8.9 Dalian 7.8 Singapore 8.3 China 28.4 27.6 17.4 Hong Kong 7.9 Kisarazu 7.4 Nagoya 10.0 China 28.6 26.0 19.9 
Hong Kong 8.7 Nagoya 6.2 Nagoya 8.2 South Korea 3.4 7.5 24.8 Oita 7.3 Hong Kong 6.1 Busan 7.5 South Korea 4.4 7.2 30.3 
Nagoya 5.7 Hong Kong 5.9 Busan 5.4 Russia 0.2 1.2 2.2 Nagoya 6.5 Singapore 5.6 Tobata 5.8 Russia 0.2 0.6 2.6 
Yokohama 5.1 Kisarazu 4.1 Dalian 5.3 Other 30.8 24.6 26.1 Kisarazu 5.9 Dalian 5.5 Kisarazu 5.3 Other 22.9 14.9 13.4 
Rajin 
Nakhodka 15.6 Singapore 13.1 Nakhodka 32.0 Japan 54.8 40.4 43.1 Shantou 16.3 Tsuruga 16.6 Nakhodka 37.6 Japan 61.8 69.3 32.8 
Mutsure 7.5 Vladivostok 12.4 Tomakomai 8.4 China 11.4 13.3 2.3 Himeji 11.3 Hitachi 12.5 Niigata 11.8 China 32.8 7.7 1.5 
Shantou 6.2 Tsuruga 8.2 Niigata 8.2 South Korea 2.3 6.5 4.8 Dalian 7.8 Taichung 7.1 Posyet 7.3 South Korea 0.0 1.2 6.1 
Mizushima 4.9 Hong Kong 5.3 Ko Sichang 6.0 Russia 17.7 17.3 37.1 Hachinohe 6.4 Muroran 6.6 Zarubino 6.6 Russia 2.2 6.2 57.2 
Singapore 4.1 Mutsure 4.3 Maizuru 5.4 Other 13.8 22.5 12.7 Okinawa 5.9 Kanda 5.1 Tomakomai 4.9 Other 3.2 15.6 2.4 
Songjin 
Singapore 47.8 Osaka 42.3 Singapore 12.4 Japan 11.1 50.2 15.0 Gladstone 47.8 Hiroshima 42.3 Ulsan 31.1 Japan 11.1 50.2 28.4 
Paradip 41.0 Panama Canal 34.1 Incheon 6.8 China 0.0 8.0 0.0 Hong Kong 41.0 Alang 34.1 Pohang 6.9 China 41.0 0.0 3.3 
Osaka 11.1 Shanghai 8.0 Kaohsiung 5.9 South Korea 0.0 0.0 26.9 Niihama 11.1 Incheon 8.0 Laem Chabang 5.6 South Korea 0.0 8.0 52.3 
- - Nakhodka 7.7 Vladivostok 5.7 Russia 0.0 7.7 7.8 - - Kobe 7.9 Nagoya 5.2 Russia 0.0 7.7 9.1 
- - Toyohashi 4.0 Busan 5.7 Other 88.9 34.1 50.3 - - Nakhodka 7.7 Vladivostok 4.9 Other 47.9 34.1 6.9 
Wonsan 
Ulsan 30.8 Niigata 41.9 Niigata 26.6 Japan 48.7 61.2 48.2 Niigata 26.4 Niigata 41.0 Niigata 26.3 Japan 61.0 66.6 55.6 
Niigata 25.0 Ningbo 6.1 Ulsan 8.6 China 2.0 16.4 2.3 Ulsan 17.9 Bintulu 6.3 Kiire 7.9 China 1.9 3.8 3.9 
Yokohama 5.2 Kashima 5.9 Busan 8.1 South Korea 36.5 6.2 23.7 Busan 5.9 Onsan 5.5 Ulsan 7.2 South Korea 26.6 9.2 23.7 
Trincomalee 5.1 Qingdao 4.6 Kashima 8.0 Russia 0.0 5.5 10.6 Osaka 5.9 Mizushima 5.5 Busan 6.6 Russia 0.1 6.4 15.3 
Chiba 4.8 Nakhodka 3.9 Bangkok 4.2 Other 12.8 10.7 15.2 Keelung 4.4 Nakhodka 3.7 Vladivostok 4.2 Other 10.4 14.0 1.5 
 
Related countries: Japan China South Korea Russia 
Source: authors, calculated from Lloyd’s Marine Intelligence Unit 
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